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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF UTAH 
ANGELA BYERS, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
-vs-
CREATIVE CORNER, INC. 
and LYN PELTON, 
Defendants and Appellees. 
Case No. 20000782-SC 
Priority 15 
BRIEF OF APPELLEES 
Defendants/Appellees Creative Corner, Inc. and Lyn Pelton (hereinafter 
"Defendants"or "Appellees" ), by and through counsel E. Paul Wood, submits the 
following Brief of Appellees in the above-referenced appeal: 
JURISDICTIONAL AUTHORITIES 
This Court has jurisdiction over the matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
78-2-2(3)0) (1996). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Did the trial court correctly grant Appellees' Motion to Dismiss for 
Failure to State a Claim where Plaintiff sues her former employer (which employs less 
than fifteen (15) persons) and an officer of her former employer under a common law 
1 
theory of wrongful discharge based upon sexual discrimination where the Complaint 
alleges that a public policy exception to the at-will employment presumption is stated in 
the Utah Anti-Discrimination Act, Utah Code Ann. §§34A-5-101, et seq. ("UADA") 
and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §2000e-3 ("Title VII"). The 
standard of review of a trial court's granting a motion to dismiss is correctness. 
Peterson v. Board ofEduc, 1993 UT 855 P.2d 241, 242. The trial court is required to 
take all allegations stated in the Complaint as true and consider all reasonable 
inferences to be drawn from those facts in a light most favorable to the Plaintiff. Prows 
v. State, 1991 UT 822 P.2d 764. The court shall dismiss a claim only in the event the 
Plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of her claim. Colman v. Utah State Land 
Bd., 1990 UT 795 P.2d 622. 
2. Did the trial court properly exclude from its consideration of Appellant's 
Motion for a New Trial new legal theories raised for the first time in Appellant's Rule 
59(a)(7) Motion for a New Trial? The trial court's ruling on a Rule 59 Motion for a 
New Trial is reviewed under an "abuse of discretion" standard. Child v. Gonda, UT 
1998 972 P.2d 425, 428. 
DETERMINATIVE LAW 
Utah Anti-Discrimination Act, §§34A-5-101 etseq. is included in the Addendum. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
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Appellant Angela Byers (hereinafter "Byers" or "Appellant") sues her former 
employer, Creative Comer, Inc., and its officer, Lyn Pelton, claiming wrongful discharge 
in violation of Utah public policy because at the time of her termination, Angela Byers 
was pregnant. Since Creative Comer, Inc. employed less than fifteen (15) employees at 
the time of termination, Byers could not state a claim for relief against Creative Comer, 
Inc. under the UADA or Title VII, and hence initiated a common law tort action for 
wrongful discharge based on sexual discrimination alleging a public policy exception 
found in Title VII to the at-will employment presumption. 
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
On November 5, 1999, Byers filed a Complaint alleging the common law claim of 
wrongful termination. Appellees' filed their Motion to Dismiss the Complaint and for 
Attorneys Fees and Memorandum in support thereof. Byers filed her Memorandum 
Opposing the Motion to Dismiss and Appellees filed their Reply Memorandum. Appellees 
filed the Notice to Submit for Decision with request for oral argument, which was 
scheduled for February 14, 2000. Prior to oral argument, this court decided Burton v. 
Exam Center Industrial and General Medical Clinic, Inc., 2000 UT 18, 994 P.2d 1261. 
Byers, whose attorney represented Dr. Burton in the Burton case, filed a Supplemental 
Authorities memorandum on the strength of the Burton case, stating, "Burton addresses 
virtually all of the issues addressed in this matter" (Supplemental Authorities P.l; R. 100; 
see Addendum) and also alleging additional statutory authority. Appellees filed their Reply 
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Memorandum. The court granted Appellees' Motion to Dismiss after oral argument. Byers 
filed a Motion for New Trial, alleging error at law, pursuant to Rule 59(a)(7) of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure, with supporting Memorandum. Appellees filed their Reply 
Memorandum and Byers filed her Notice to Submit for Decision. The trial court denied 
Byers' Motion for a New Trial under its Memorandum Decision. The Complaint, Motion 
to Dismiss and Memorandum, Appellant's Supplemental Authorities Memorandum and 
Rule 59 Motion and Memorandum and the Court's Order and Memorandum Decision are 
included in the Addendum, for this court's review. Byers appealed the trial court's 
granting of Appellees' Motion to Dismiss and denial of her Motion for a New Trial. 
DISPOSITION BY TRIAL COURT 
Byers' Complaint was dismissed by the trial court based upon Appellees' Motion 
to Dismiss for failure to state a claim. 
RELEVANT FACTS 
The facts set forth in the single cause of action alleged in the Complaint are: 
1. Defendant Creative Corner, Inc., is a Utah 
Corporation in good standing doing business in Salt Lake 
County. (Record at 1.) 
2. Defendant Lyn Pelton is an officer of Defendant 
Creative Corner, Inc., and the person who made all relevant 
decisions and took all relevant actions alleged herein. (Record 
atl . ) 
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3. All actions alleged herein took place in Salt 
Lake County and venue and jurisdiction are appropriate in 
Salt Lake County. (Record at 1-2.) 
4. The Plaintiff was employed by the Defendant 
Creative Corner, Inc. at a rate of $ 11.00 per hour plus $200.00 
per month car allowance. (Record at 2.) 
5. The Plaintiff was terminated on the 15th day of 
October, 1999. (Record at 2.) 
6. Defendant Pelton said that Plaintiff was 
terminated because she was pregnant and unable to lift. 
(Record at 2.) 
7. Plaintiff specifically discussed lifting with her 
doctor and was able to lift all items she had been required to 
lift during her employment with Creative Comer, Inc. (Record 
at 2.) 
8. Plaintiff was terminated because she was 
pregnant. (Record at 2.) 
9. At the time Plaintiff was terminated, Defendants 
employed fewer than fifteen (15) employees. (Record at 2.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. Judge Medley correctly determined that under Retherferd v. AT&T 
Communs. oftheMt States, Inc., 1992 UT 844 P.2d 949, Peterson v. Browning, 1992 UT 
832 P.2d 1280 and Burton v. Exam Center Industrial and General Medical Clinic, Inc., 
2000 UT 18, 994 P.2d 1261, that Title VII, the cited federal statutes and Utah State 
Executive Orders do not create a public policy exception to the at-will employment 
presumption in Utah. 
5 
A. The plain language of the exclusive remedy provisions of the UAD A 
states a legislative intent to limit all employment discrimination claims in the State of Utah 
to those claims which meet the specific requirements of the Act. 
B. The Burton case rejects, as a basis for an employment discrimination 
claim, Title VII and each case cited by Byers in the trial court. 
C. Under Burton and Peterson v. Browning, each of the federal and state 
statutes, regulations and Utah Executive Orders cited by Byers are inapplicable to the case 
sub judicia since each statute, regulation and Executive Order govern the employment 
relationship between the federal or state government and its employees or contractors. 
2. Byers misinterpreted Judge Medley's Rule 59 Memorandum Decision as 
having failed to consider 156 federal statutes and regulations, 5 Utah statutes and 22 
administrative regulations and 10 Executive Orders where the Memorandum Decision 
specifically refers to the statutes, regulations and Executive Orders. 
A. Judge Medley considered and rejected the federal and state statutes 
and Executive Orders cited in Byers' Supplemental Authorities based upon Byers' failure 
to analyze any of the statutes, regulations, or Executive Orders as required by Peterson v. 
Browning. 
B. Judge Medley properly rejected eight newly analyzed federal statutes 
and Executive Order as new legal theory brought for the first time in a post-judgment 
motion. 
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C. Rejecting the eight newly analyzed federal statutes and Executive 
Order is harmless error since, as a matter of law, none reflect a clear and substantial public 
policy of the State of Utah. 
3. Since no claim for relief is stated against Creative Comer, Inc., the employer, 
it follows that no claim for relief is stated against its President, Lyn Pelton. 
ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DETERMINED THAT UNDER UTAH LAW NO 
COMMON LAW CAUSE OF ACTION EXISTS FOR WRONGFUL TERMINATION 
OF AN AT-WILL EMPLOYEE BASED UPON SEXUAL DISCRIMINATION. 
The trial court correctly dismissed Ms. Byers' Complaint based upon Ms. Byers' 
inability to identify any federal or state statute or regulation identifying a clear and 
substantial public policy in Utah against a small employer terminating an employee based 
upon sex. The Complaint at paragraph 13 (R.3; Addendum) alleges two specific statutory 
basis for Utah public policy, i.e. the UADA and Title VII. In her Supplemental 
Memorandum (R. 100-133; Addendum), Ms. Byers also set forth ten Utah Executive 
Orders and one-hundred fifty-six (156) federal statutory citations, Utah Statutes and 22 
administrative regulations, all of which were considered and rejected by the trial court. 
In January, 2000, this court decided Burton v. Exam Center Industrial and General 
Medical Clinic, Inc., 2000 UT 18, 994 P.2d 1261, which is virtually identical to the case 
before the court except that the Plaintiff, Dr. Burton, alleged age discrimination and here, 
the allegation is discrimination based upon sex. The Burton court specifically rejected 
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identical arguments and case law now being advanced by Ms. Byers as creating a public 
policy exception to the at-will employment presumption. The sliver of hope which the 
Utah Supreme Court left on the horizon in the Burton case for Ms. Byers' sex 
discrimination claim is contained in dictum written in reply to Justice Durham's and 
Stewart's dissent which states: 
The dissent charges that our decision opens the door for small 
employers in Utah to discriminate not only on the basis of age, 
but on the basis of sex, race, religion, and disability. Suffice 
it to here say that sex, race, religion, and disability may 
present considerations and a public policy against discrimina-
tion on those grounds might conceivably be found in other 
statutes of this state. Id., 994 at 1267 
The Burton court considered and rejected Title VII as basis for Utah public policy, 
which is the single significant basis alleged on appeal by Ms. Byers for her public policy 
argument. Title VII is clearly not "statutes of this state" required by the Burton dictum. 
The Utah Executive Orders and federal statutes additionally alleged by Ms. Byers are 
inapplicable to private employers in the State of Utah and have been rejected by this court 
in Burton as a basis for Utah public policy. The trial court, having followed the 
precedence of the Burton decision and Retherford v. AT&T Communication of Mountain 
States, Inc., 1992 UT 844 P.2d 949 and Peterson v. Browning, 1992 UT 832 P.2d 1280, 
correctly determined that the Complaint fails to state a claim against the Appellees upon 
which relief may be granted. 
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A. The UADA Exclusive Remedy Provisions. The original Utah Anti-
Discrimination Act was enacted in 1969 with the purpose of eliminating discrimination in 
payment of wages based solely on sex, where men and women were doing the same or 
similar work under all of these same conditions. Kopp v. Salt Lake City, 1973 UT, Utah 
2d 170, 506 P.2d 809. The UADA creates a statutory cause of action against an employer 
for discrimination based upon protected categories which is enforceable by the State of 
Utah through the Division of Anti-Discrimination and Labor. Utah Code Ann. §34A-5-
107. The UADA defines an employer as a "person employing 15 or more employees 
within the state " Utah Code Ann. 34A-5-102. 
Utah Code Ann. §34A-5-106 defines a set of "discriminatory or unfair employment 
practices", which in pertinent part states: 
(1) It is a discriminatory or prohibited 
employment practice to take any action described in 
Subsections (l)(a) through (f). 
(a)(i). An employer may not refuse to hire, 
promote, discharge, demote, or terminate any person, or to 
retaliate against, harass, or discriminate in matters of 
compensation or in terms, privileges, and conditions of 
employment against any person otherwise qualified, because 
of: 
(A) race; 
(B) color; 
(C) sex; 
(D) pregnancy, childbirth, pregnancy-related conditions; 
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Utah Code Ann. §35A-5-107 provides the procedure for "an aggrieved person" to 
file a claim, which requires filing with the Utah Anti-Discrimination Commission, a 
request for agency action within one hundred eighty (180) days of the alleged 
discriminatory or prohibitive employment practice, with the promise that the Commission 
shall investigate the claim, attempt to settle the claim, and in the event settlement is 
unsuccessful, adjudicate the claim. 
Critically important to the statutory framework which creates the cause of action in 
Utah for a discrimination in employment claim is the exclusive remedy section of the 
UADA, §34A-5-107(15) which states: 
The procedures contained in this section are the exclusive 
remedy under state law for employment discrimination based 
upon race, color, sex, retaliation, pregnancy, childbirth or 
pregnancy-related conditions, age, religion, national origin or 
disability. 
This court has determined that the UADA preempts common law claims of 
employment discrimination in the State of Utah. In Retherferd v. AT&T Communs. of the 
Mountain States, Inc., 1992 UT 844 P.2d 949, the court held: 
We begin with Retherferd's claim for discharge in violation 
of public policy. In order to prove this tort, Retherferd must 
show that AT&T discharged her in a manner or for a reason 
that contravened a "clear and substantial public policy" of the 
State of Utah, a public policy rooted in Utah's constitution or 
statute, (citation omitted). The only possible source in Utah's 
statutes or constitution for a clear and substantial policy 
allegedly violated by Retherferd's discharge is the UADA's 
prohibition of retaliation based on good faith Complaints of 
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employment discrimination. (Utah Code Ann. §34-35-2(15). 
Without deciding that the statute at issue rises to the level of 
a clear and substantial public policy, we find that in the 
absence of this public policy declaration, Retherferd would be 
unable to allege an action for this tort. Simply put, if there 
were no UADA policy against retaliation, there could be no 
tort for discharge in violation of this public policy. Applying 
the Mounteer test (the "indispensable element" test) it is plain 
that the harm the UADA addresses is an indispensable 
element in Retherferd's tort cause of action; therefore, the 
UADA must preempt this claim. Id., 844 at 965. 
Importantly, this court emphasized that the only possible source in Utah for a clear 
and substantial public policy related to the discharge based upon retaliation was the 
UADA, and did not rely upon Title VII or any other federal statute specifically prohibiting 
retaliation in employment. Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §§2000e-2,-3. 
The Burton court interpreted the holding in Retherford as applying to only those 
employers who were subject to the act, i.e. those employing greater than fifteen (15) 
employees. Burton, 99 A P.2d at 1264. The holding leaves open the possibility of a claim 
of wrongful discharge against an employer who is not subject to the terms of the UADA, 
i.e., those employing less than fifteen (15) persons, under an exception to the at-will 
employment presumption in Utah based upon violation of a clear and substantial public 
policy. 
B. Utah Public Policy Exception to "At-will Employment Presumption". 
A Plaintiff attempting to establish a public policy exception to the at-will employment 
presumption carries a heavy burden under Utah law. In Peterson v. Browning, 1992 UT 
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832 P.2d 1280, the court described the public policy exceptions in terms of an employee's 
conduct, not status, such as age or sex, as follows: 
Actions falling within the public policy exception typically 
involved termination of employment for (1) refusing to 
commit an illegal or wrongful act, (2) performing a public 
obligation, or (3) exercising a legal right or privilege (citations 
omitted). Id. 832, P.2d at 1281. Also See Ryan v. Dan's 
Food Stores, Inc. 1998 UT 972 P.2d 395, 408. 
The court then underscored the burden of a Plaintiff: 
This court has indicated that it will narrowly construe the 
public policies on which a wrongful termination act may be 
based (citations omitted). It is not the purpose of the 
exception to eliminate employer discretion in discharging at-
will employees (citations omitted), or to impose a requirement 
of "good cause" for discharge of every employee. 
Accordingly, we hold that the public policy exception applies 
in this state when the statutory language expressing the public 
conscience is clear and when the affected interests of society 
are substantial. The identification of clear and substantia] 
public policies will require case-by-case development. £ , 
832 P.2d at 1281-82. 
The Peterson court then clearly delineated the requirements a Plaintiff must 
establish to provide a showing of a "clear and substantial public policy": 
To provide the basis for an action under the public policy 
exception, a violation of a state or federal law must 
contravene the clear and substantial public policy of the State 
of Utah. Although many state and federal laws will reflect the 
Utah public policy, and may, in fact, provide the source of 
Utah public policy, a Plaintiff must establish the connection 
between the law violated and the public policies of the State 
of Utah. Id., 832 P.2d at 1282. Also See. Fox v. MCI 
Communications Corp., 1997 UT 931 P.2d 857. 
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Angela Byers' Complaint and supporting authorities completely fail under the 
Peterson test to "establish the connection between the law violation and the public policies 
of the State of Utah". 
C. Title VII Is Not a Basis for the Public Policy Exception in Utah. The Burton 
case specifically and squarely rejected each basis raised by Byers in her Complaint and in 
this appeal as creating a basis for public policy exception to the at-will employment 
presumption in the State of Utah. 
In that case, Dr. Burton claimed that he had been terminated on the basis of his age 
which violated the UADA and the Federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 
U.S.C. §621-634 (1998), as well as other federal statutes. Byers sets forth the same five 
cases in the trial court and in this appeal which were rejected by this court in Burton as 
setting forth a basis for creating a public policy exception: Molesworth v. Brandon, 341 
Md. 621, 672 A.2d 608 (1996); Kerrigan v. Magnum Entertainment, Inc., 804 F. Supp. 
733(D)Md. (1992); Collins v. Rizkana, 73 Ohio St. 3d 65, 652 N.E. 2d 653 (1995); 
Bennett v. Hardy, 113 Wn. 2d 912, 784 P.2d 1258 (1990) and Williamson v. Greene, 200 
W. Va. 421, 490 S.E. 2d 23 (1997). 
Contrary to the reasoning in the five cases advanced by Ms. Byers, the Utah 
Supreme Court in Burton adopted the California Supreme Court's reasoning in Jennings 
v. Marralle, 8 Cal. 4th 121, 876 P.2d 1074, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d 275 (Cal. 1994) which 
considered the public policy argument contained in California's Fair Employment and 
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Housing Act. The Act declares a public policy of protecting the right and opportunity to 
seek, obtain and hold employment without discrimination on various grounds, including 
age, which was defined as over 40 years. Exempted from the terms of the act were "small 
employers" which were defined as employers who employ less than five employees. The 
Burton court quoted the Jennings Court as follows: 
This exemption of small employers from the FEHA ban on 
age discrimination was enacted simultaneously to and is 
inseparable from the legislative statement of policy. For that 
reason, and because no other statute or constitutional 
provision barred age discrimination, we conclude that there 
presently exists no "fundamental policy" which precludes age 
discrimination by a small employer. Thus, there is no 
independent basis for an action for tortuous discharge in 
violation of policy. Burton v. Exam Center Industrial and 
General Medical Clinic, Inc. at 1065 and Jennings v. Morralle 
at 1076. 
The Burton court then adopted the Jennings court reasoning holding: 
We are not persuaded that the UAD A declares a public policy 
which is "clear and substantial" with respect to small 
employers. The California Supreme Court's reasoning in 
Jennings that "the exemption of small employers from 
[California's] FEHA ban on age discrimination was enacted 
simultaneously to, and is inseparable from, the legislative 
statement of policy, is sound and unanswerable. Our 
legislature has made a similar decision to prohibit age 
discrimination in the termination of employees only by large 
employers and, if, as Burton contends, small employers should 
likewise be prohibited, that is a matter for the legislature, not 
the court, should address." Id., 994 P.2d at 1266. 
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The language from the Burton case while dealing directly with the UADA, applies 
equally as well to the Title VII legislation. Like the UADA, Title VII applies only to 
employers having greater than fifteen (15) employees. Title VII has expressed terms 
prohibiting discrimination in employment based on sex, age, religion, national origin. It 
defies reason and logic to advance the proposition that where the Utah Supreme Court will 
not substitute its judgment for that of the Utah State Legislature regarding the exemption 
provided in the UADA, it would change its declared position and substitute its opinion for 
that of the United States Congress and determine that a claim is created under Title VII 
against small employers as stating Utah public policy on sex discrimination in 
employment. The language from Justice Barbara Manson's dissent in Roberts v. Dudley, 
2000 WA, 140 Wn. 2d58, 993 P.2d 901 is clearly applicable: 
The majority also relies on the language in the WLAD which 
states that the statute is not meant to limit other types of 
actions for sex discrimination. It reasons that because the law 
declares that it is a civil right to be free from discrimination in 
employment, the small employer exemption cannot preclude 
a civil action. This logic does not hold. The civil right is 
created in terms of employment by employers of eight or more 
persons. It is illogical to conclude that the Legislature 
intended to both protect small employers and subject them to 
liability in the same statute. Id., 993 P.2d at 914. 
Additionally, the Burton court specifically found that Title VII's legislative history 
has the same purpose as the UADA, which further demonstrates the Burton court's specific 
consideration and rejection of Title VII in its ruling: 
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Several federal courts have expressed the same reasons for 
small employers exemption found in certain anti-
discrimination statutes. See e.g. Tomka v. Seller Corp., 66 
F.3d 1295, 1314 (Second Circ. 1995) (legislative history 
indicates that "the protection of intimate and personal 
relations existing in small business" was the reason for Title 
VIFs small employer exemption); Miller v. Maxwell's Int., 
Inc.,9\ F.2d583,587(9thCir. 1993) ("Congress did not want 
to burden small entities with costs associated with litigating 
discrimination claims." Id., 993 P.2d at 1267. 
Finally, the Burton opinion specifically rejects Title VII as a basis for creating a 
clear and substantial public policy in Utah, stating: 
Nor do we find any federal statute that can provide the basis 
for a tort action against small employers. See, heathen v. 
Research Found, of City Univ. of N.Y, 658 F. Supp. 651 
(S.D.N.Y. 1987) (stating that federal claim under federal 
statute "cannot serve as a basis to expand employees' 
remedies under New York state common law of tort"). 
Because we can find no constitutional provision or other 
statute which declares a clear and substantial public policy 
against age discrimination in employment practices, we must 
decline to create an exception to the general rule prevailing in 
this state that employment is presumed to be on an at-will 
basis for both the employer and the employee. Id., 993 P.2d 
at 1266. 
No other jurisdiction, in creating a public policy exception to the at-will 
presumption, has relied on the federally enacted Title VII as the primary basis for a public 
policy exception, but has looked almost exclusively to statutes of the state. Molesworth 
v. Brandon, 672 A.2d 608 (1996) ("at least thirty-four statutes, one executive order, and 
one constitutional amendment in Maryland"); Collins v. Rizkana, 1995 OH, 652 N.E. 2d 
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653 (specific state statute prohibiting discrimination by "any employer", RC4112.02; at 
criminal statutes, RC2097.06 and .21); Bennett v. Hardy, 1990 WA, 784 P.2d 1258 (Citing 
Washington's law against discrimination, RCW 49.60); Williamson v. Greene, 1997 WV 
490 S.E.2d 23 (Citing West Virginia Human Rights Act). 
Byers has not alleged any facts, statutes, regulations or constitutional provisions 
which sets apart her claim for sexual discrimination from Burton's claim for age 
discrimination. Byers' claim must be denied under the sound principles set forth in 
Burton. 
Finally, Byers claim that Title VII sets forth a "clear and substantial public policy" 
of the State of Utah must fail under the requirements ofPeterson v. Browning in that Byers 
has not and cannot set forth "the connection between the law violated and the public 
policies of Utah". 
If the legislature had intended that a cause of action for employment discrimination 
extend beyond the terms of the existing UADA, it could have amended the provisions of 
the UADA in its last legislative session in the wake of the Burton decision. However, no 
legislative action was taken evidencing this state's intention not to extend prohibition 
regarding discrimination in employment practices beyond the exclusive remedy provisions 
of the UADA. 
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The spurious argument that the Burton case does not apply to the case before the 
court was raised by Byers for the first time in her Rule 59 Memorandum and should not 
be considered by the court. In Re: Estate ofJustheim, supra. 
Title VII simply does not create a "clear and substantial public polic)'" in the State 
of Utah with respect to discriminatory practices by private employers employing less than 
fifteen (15) people. 
D. The Executive Orders Do Not Apply to Appellants. Each of the Executive 
Orders signed by Utah governors cited by Ms. Byers in her brief at pages 14 and 15 apply 
only to employees of the State of Utah, its subdivisions, and the State's contractors. The 
Burton court rejected statutes or administrative regulations applying to governmental 
employees as a basis for restrictions on a private employer: "Amicus also relies on Utah 
Administrative Code R606-3-2, which prohibits age discrimination by persons contracting 
with the state. While arguably a public policy can be found in that statute and code, it 
obviously has no application to a private employer." Burton, 994 P,2d at 1266. 
E. Federal Statutes Cited by Appellant are Inapplicable. Each of the federal 
statutes cited by Appellant at pages 12 to 14 in her brief were initially submitted post-trial 
in support of the Motion for a New Trial and therefore should not be addressed by this 
court as part of the correctness of the ruling of the trial court with respect to granting 
Appellees' Motion to Dismiss. In Re: Estate ofJustheim, 1984 UT 824 P.2d 432, 434. 
(see section II herein). However, in addition, each of the cited statutes do not apply to 
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Creative Comer, Inc. and its employees in the State of Utah as required under Peterson v. 
Browning, supra and Burton v. Exam Center Industrial and General Medical Clinic, Inc. 
The Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 USC §206(b) relates to discrimination in compensation 
to employees so long as the employer is covered by the terms of the Act, which require a 
gross income in excess of 5500,000 and participation in interstate commerce. 
Ms. Byers cites 42 USC §5057 which makes it illegal for an employer to 
discriminate on the basis of sex regarding a volunteer. Clearly, this does not apply to the 
employment relationship between Creative Comers, Inc. and Angela Byers. 
42 U.S.C. §5057 applies to sex discrimination among "volunteers" which clearly 
Angela Byers is not. The remaining four codes of federal regulation, 49 CFR §26 5.7,23 
CFR §230.113,47 CFR §73.2080 and 41 CFR §60-1.4 apply to government employment 
where those who contract with the government and not private employers. 
Finally, 2 U.S.C. §1311 and 3 U.S.C. §411 apply to the President of the United 
States and the United States Congress and not a private employer. 
Ms. Byers has failed in her attempt to set forth any "statutes of this state" which 
create a public policy against discrimination based upon sex. The trial court correctly 
found that Ms. Byers failed to state a claim against the Defendants upon which relief may 
be granted. 
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II. 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY REJECTED 
ADDITIONAL POST-JUDGMENT LEGAL THEORIES. 
Angela Byers misinterprets and/or misrepresents the trial court's ruling on her Rule 
59 Motion. In order to address the misinterpretation, the course of proceedings before the 
trial court are critically important: 
After Appellees submitted their Reply Memorandum on the Motion to Dismiss, 
Angela Byers submitted a Supplemental Memorandum listing citations to 156 federal 
statute and CFR regulations, five Utah statutes, 22 administrative regulations, and ten Utah 
Executive Orders, asserting without any required analysis that these statutes and Executive 
Orders adequately reflect a clear and substantial public policy in the State of Utah 
regarding sex discrimination. (Appellant's Supplemental Memorandum R. 100-123; 
Addendum). After Appellees submitted their Reply Memorandum (R. 124-133; 
Addendum), the trial court granted Appellee's Motion to Dismiss after having considered 
the federal and state statutes and Executive Orders advanced by Byers. Byers then 
submitted her Rule 59 Motion and supporting memorandum where she provided analysis 
regarding eight of the previously cited federal statutes and five of the Utah Executive 
Orders, claiming each creates a clear and substantial public policy prohibiting sex 
discrimination in the State of Utah. (R. 165-173; Addendum). 
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The trial court correctly determined not to consider the additional analysis made 
by Angela Byers regarding the eight federal statues and Utah Executive Orders in its Rule 
59 decision. 
A. Utah Standard on Rule 59 Motions. Motions for new trials are generally not 
favored at the law, in part because it is costly and inefficient to hold multiple trials on the 
same cause of action. Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch., 1991 UT, 817 P.2d 789, 803. Courts 
do not grant new trials unless it is reasonably clear that prejudicial err has tainted the 
proceedings or that substantial justice has not been done. 817 P.2d at 804-805. A trial 
court has no discretion to grant a new trial absent a showing of at least one of the grounds 
set forth in Rule 59(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Moonlake Elec. Ass. yn v. 
Ultra Systems WConstructors, Inc., 1988 UT App? 767 P.2d 125, 128. 
B, Byers Misinterprets the Trial Court's Rule 59 Decision. Angela Byers 
misinterprets and/or misrepresent's the trial court's Rule 59 Memorandum Decision when 
she declares: 
In its Memorandum Decision, the trial court declined to 
consider citation to statutes, regulations, and executive orders 
other than those cited in the Complaint on the grounds that 
they were "outside the pleadings." The trial court erred. 
(Appellant's brief, 20-21). 
Under it's Ruling with respect to Rule 59, the trial court distinguishes between the 
statutes and Executive Orders submitted in the Supplemental Authorities Memorandum 
and the Rule 59 Memorandum: 
21 
In an attempt to mirror Molesworth, the Plaintiff filed a 
Supplemental Memorandum with an attachment listing 156 
federal codes, five Utah Statutes and 22 Utah Regulations 
which prohibits sex discrimination under various 
circumstances. The Plaintiff stated that the list was provided 
"as additional sources of public policy against sex 
discrimination, in addition to the UADA and Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act. . ." Supplemental Memorandum Authority 
P.2. However, the Plaintiff provided no copies of these to the 
court, nor any legal analysis which explains how the latter 
provisions provide a clear and substantial policy against sex 
discrimination in the State of Utah. 
In her Rule 59 Motion, the Plaintiff provided additional 
statutes and Executive Orders (emphasis added) it would like 
this court to "analyze" as well. Plaintiffs Rule 59 Motion 
P.6. However, these latter statutes and Executive Orders 
(emphasis added) are outside the pleadings, could not have 
been considered by this court in its ruling on the Defendant's 
Motion to Dismiss, and cannot be considered now to find an 
error of law in the previous proceeding. Therefore, this court 
will not consider the additional statutes and Executive Orders 
in this decision (Memorandum Decision, P.2.) 
In the next paragraph of the Memorandum Decision, the court specifically stated: 
The only issue this court will review is whether the court 
committed an error of law by not finding a clear and 
substantial public policy exception for sex discrimination by 
small employers based on the list of codes, statutes and 
regulations attached by the Plaintiff in her Supplemental 
Memorandum. (Memorandum Decision, p. 2) 
Contrary to the assertion that the court failed to properly consider the additional 
statutory authority for sex discrimination, the court specifically notes that it is doing so. 
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C. The Court Correctly Declined to Consider "New Legal Theories" in its 
Ruling on the Pleadings. Under Utah law, each of the 156 federal statutes, five Utah 
Statutes and 22 administrative rules, and ten Executive Orders are potentially a separate 
basis for Utah public policies; therefore in order to establish a clear and substantial public 
policy, each must be analyzed to demonstrate the application of the statute to the facts 
before the Court and how contravention of the statute specifically contravenes a public 
policy in the State of Utah. Berube v. Fashion Centre, Ltd., 1989 UT 771, P.2d 1033; 
Retherford v. AT&T Communs. of the ML States, Inc., 1992 UT, 844 P.2d 949; Peterson 
v. Browning, 1992 UT 832, P.2d 1280, 1283. 
Angela Byers failed in her Supplemental Authorities Memorandum to perform any 
analysis of the statute and the court declined to do the work for her. The conclusory 
statements made in Byers' Rule 59 Motion regarding the previously cited, but not analyzed 
federal states were essentially new legal theories. As new legal theories were being 
advanced in post-trial motions, the court properly declined to consider the theories. Estate 
ofJustheim, 824 P.2d 432, 434 (Utah App. 1991). 
D. Failure to Consider Eight Federal Statutes and Executive Orders is Harmless 
Error. Even in the event the trial court should have considered the eight newly "analyzed" 
federal statutes and Utah Executive Orders, the failure to do so is harmless error. None of 
the cited federal statutes or Utah State Executive Orders apply to Appellee Creative 
Corner, Inc. (See Argument, Section II D. and E.) 
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If the court erred by failing to consider the federal statutes Executive Orders in its 
Rule 59 Memorandum Decision, it was harmless error not affecting the outcome of the 
decision. State v. Hamilton, 1992 UT 827 P.2d 232, 240. 
III. 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DISMISSED 
THE DISCRIMINATION AGAINST PELTON. 
Having failed to generally state a claim for relief on the basis of sexual 
discrimination in employment against Creative Comer, Inc., the trial court correctly 
dismissed the claims against Lyn Pelton, President, Creative Comer, Inc., Burton v. Exam 
Center Industrial and General Clinic, Inc. 
CONCLUSION 
Angela Byers failed to cite any federal or state statute or regulation, or constitutional 
provision which prohibits Creative Comer, Inc., an employer of less than fifteen (15) 
people, from terminating an employee allegedly based upon sexual discrimination. There 
is no "clear and substantial public policy" in the State of Utah relating to small employers 
termination of employees based upon sex. The exclusive remedy provisions of the UADA 
declares a clear legislative policy of the State of Utah that a common law tort of 
discrimination based upon sex for a small employer is not recognized. The holding the 
Burton case that no common law cause of action exist in the state of Utah against small 
employers based upon allegations of discrimination in employment based upon protected 
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classification absent a clear and substantial public policy squarely applies to require 
upholding of the trial court's dismissal of Byers' claim. 
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